



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ATTITUDES AND THEIR RELATION TO
HUMAN MANIFESTATIONS



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ATTITUDES AND THEIR RELATION TO HUMAN MANIFESTATIONS

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ATTITUDES AND THEIR RELATION TO HUMAN MANIFESTATIONS

GENERAL ANALYSIS

ATTITUDES: CONFUSED USE OF TERMS.

As with so many other things in the present-day confusion of thought, the term "attitude" has no clear-cut definition. It is used in the purely bodily sense to denote a pose or the disposition of the limbs, and it is also used in an abstract sense to denote a purely intellectual viewpoint. There is some validity in both of these uses of the term, but neither of them is comprehensive. This is clear if the factors are considered which go to make up either a bodily pose or what is regarded as an intellectual viewpoint.

For instance, if a human being is seated in a chair, it is said that he is sitting in "a negligent attitude" or "a tense attitude," or whatever description fits the emotion which his pose suggests. But if the pose can suggest that he is undergoing a particular degree or nature of feeling, it

must be something more than a mere disposition of his limbs in the bodily sense. The disposing of the limbs must be under the direction of what we call a "state of mind." Two factors, therefore, have gone to producing the pose.

BODILY AND MENTAL ATTITUDES.

The bodily factor must be involved, since a human being can only sit as the symmetry and harmonious proportions of his bodily form permit. If he were hunchbacked, or had lost a limb, he would sit differently from a normally formed person. But a mental factor must also be involved. If the pose can be described as "tense" it implies a state of suspense in the human being. But if he is in suspense, the memory of some experience must be at the basis of the suspense. He must be anticipating some happening. But he could not anticipate a happening unless he had acquired an experience in the past on which to base his anticipation. He could not look forward to the events of some future moment working out in a way that would have a particular significance for him unless he had used his reasoning faculty in some such terms as: "Because such and such a thing happened in the past and the present circum-

stances are similar, I anticipate that such and such a result will be brought about."

An attitude in the sense of a bodily pose, therefore, is not merely a matter of a particular disposition of the limbs. The bodily form determines it, but it is also directed by acquired memories of past experiences, and qualified by the human being's present assessment of his relationship with his surroundings, and the anticipation of a future relationship.

But equally, when the term is used in the intellectual sense to denote what would be called an "attitude of mind," the intellect can never be the sole factor which brings the attitude about. There must always be a bodily determination, even when the attitude appears contradictory to the human being's bodily needs or condition.

ANTAGONISM BETWEEN MIND AND BODY.

We may take, for instance, the extreme case of an addict to alcohol whose intellectual attitude is one of aversion to alcohol. Because his cells had been degenerated by alcohol he might find it impossible not to continue taking it. However averse he might be to it intellectually, he might be incapable of resisting the demand from his body.

In such a case the bodily determination would appear to be in direct contradiction to the intellectual attitude.

But where the mind was so antagonistic to the bodily demands, it could only be on the basis of some memory of unhappy or unpleasant experiences amounting to suffering. The causes might not be obvious, but even if it were merely a prejudice on grounds of social welfare, it would mean that the particular human being stood in strong need of a society to make his life possible. If he were able to conduct his life without the aids offered by a society, he would not value that society sufficiently highly to give it a greater consideration than his want of alcohol. And when it is said that he could not conduct his life without the aids offered by a society, it must imply that the society meets his needs for food, clothing and shelter—that is, meets the preponderance of his bodily needs.

So that, in such an instance, the intellectual attitude of aversion to alcohol over-riding the bodily need for alcohol would merely mean that it over-rode one particular bodily need, but was determined by the preponderance of the other bodily needs.

WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ATTITUDE ?

To determine what an attitude actually represents, however, it is necessary to consider not only what factors go to produce it, but also what function it fulfils in the organic manifestation of the human being. Why does the human being need to have an attitude or attitudes, and what advantage does he gain from them ? How does it serve the purpose of his life to be able to arrive at an attitude ?

This involves the consideration of the conditions of his life. He is primarily the organic expression of a life power. But to be such, there must be a background against which the expression can take form. That is, there must be an environment against which his life can take form. And if it can only take form against the environment, there must be a relationship between him and the environment. The human being cannot, therefore, be thought of only as existing, but as existing in a relationship. This being so, every manifestation which signifies his existence must be characterised by the relationship.

Now on his side, the human being is an organic expression by virtue of his possessing a conscious-

ness and a character. But if these constitute his being, they must also be characterised by the environment. That is to say, the environment will play its part in determining the form and nature of his organic character—his bodily system with its attributes—and also the scope of his organic consciousness—his intelligent awareness. This means that the human bodily form and its attributes must be such that the relationship with the environment can be maintained, and that the human intelligent awareness must embody self-awareness and awareness of the environment. Embodying those, it will also embody an awareness of the self-relationship with environment.

SELF-FACTOR.

This awareness of self-relationship with the environment amounts to an awareness of the comparative values of self and environment. In effect, it enables the human being to be aware in such terms as: "I represent such and such a potentiality or value: the environment represents such and such a potentiality. I have, therefore, such and such a degree of scope to realise myself towards and in response to the environment."

But this is nothing more or less than the taking

of an attitude. That is to say, an attitude is, in effect, *a statement of a human being's value in relation to his environment*. But this, in turn, must embody many factors. When a human being arrives at an awareness of his self-value, he can only do so by having regard to everything which he is. That is to say, he must be aware not only of his capacities, but also of his incapacities; not only of his strengths, but also of his weaknesses. But he could not have such an awareness without taking into account his whole bodily cell-system, and also the degree of conscious manifestation possible to that cell-system. An attitude must, therefore, as it were, speak for the whole human bodily cell-system and its qualities and attributes.

ENVIRONMENT-FACTOR.

But if the human being must always be thought of as existing in relation to the environment, he could only have an awareness of self-value by simultaneously having an awareness of the environment-value. It would be useless, for instance, for a human being to attach a high value to himself as being able to jump, if his immediate relationship with the environment was that he had to scale a precipice five hundred feet high. So that a self-

value is always dependent upon the environment-value. Equally, therefore, any attitude taken by a human being must reflect the environment, as well as speak for the whole bodily cell-system and its qualities and attributes.

This provides the basis from which attitudes may be considered. It can be seen that a human being's attitudes will vary with the presentation to him of varying aspects of the environment, and also with any changes which take place in his bodily cell-system. That is, they will vary in just so far as his relationship with environment varies. If we now consider what variations of the relationship with environment can take place, it will be possible to classify different kinds of attitudes on that basis.

KINDS OF ATTITUDES: SELF-RELIANT, SUPPORTED, DICTATED.

The human life-power can only express itself in the consciousness and character of the human organism, if it establishes the organism on terms, at least of equality, with the environment as a whole. It is, therefore, a *sine qua non* of human life that equality with the environment shall be maintained or established. The human being

must devote his manifestation primarily to this end. But we know that he can attain it by either of three ways:

- (1) Out of his own bodily resources.
- (2) By his own bodily resources allied with the resources of some compensating factor taken from the environment.
- (3) By abandoning himself to some outside dictation which will preserve him on equal terms with the environment, in return for willingness on his part to be used as the servile tool of the dictation.

RELIANCE ON SELF ALONE.

But it can be seen that whichever way the human being attains an equality with the environment, he must adopt an attitude before carrying out the equalising manifestations. If he is able to meet the environment out of his own resources, he must know that he is able to do so. And he must not believe he can do so, and attempt to do it, if he is, in fact, unable.

For instance, if he is presented with a river as an aspect of the environment. Swimming across, he would be relying upon his own bodily resources.

But if he were unequal to swimming the whole way, yet attempted to do so, he would drown. It is necessary, therefore, for him to adopt an attitude on reaching the river. And the attitude will determine his response to the environment as represented by the river. If it is one of awareness of self-sufficiency, he will rely upon himself alone and swim the river.

RELiance ON SELF PLUS COMPENSATION.

If it is one of awareness of self-inferiority, he will seek for some compensation, such as a boat. Then it would be necessary for him to take an attitude towards the boat, and this would be directed by his previous experiences in using a boat. If they were such that he was skilful in manœuvring it, the attitude would be one of ego-sufficiency. But again, he must know that he is able to handle the boat. If he attempted to do so and were unable, he might be carried away and drowned, as he would have been if he had attempted to swim. That is, he would be unable to establish equality with the river even when relying upon the boat as compensation for his own bodily inferiority.

RELIANCE ON DICTATION.

If, on reaching the river, the human being could only equalise himself with it by submitting to dictation, it would mean that he was unable to take an attitude towards it. That means he would be unable to arrive at any valuation of self in relation to the river, or of self and boat in conjunction. If he is to be established on terms of equality with the river at all, an attitude must be prescribed for him. And an attitude out of which he could attain an equality would only be of use if he had been adapted to it—that is to say, if he had been drilled into swimming or handling a boat, and had gained an adequate degree of efficiency in the drill. It will be necessary to examine each of these contingencies separately, to see all that is implied by each different attitude. For the time being it is sufficient to note that different descriptions of attitudes are possible, according to whether the human being can rely *upon himself*, *upon himself plus compensation*, or *must submit to dictation*.

The vital point about all attitudes, whatever classification they fall into, is that all human manifestations result directly from them. Whether it

is pure self-expression or response to some impression which the environment makes upon the human being, every manifestation must take the two factors—self-value and environment-value—into account, and the attitude is the summing-up of both, and the statement of the potentiality of self, relative to the potentiality of environment.

INCONSTANCY OF ATTITUDES THROUGH BODILY CHANGES.

Two considerations emerge from this. One is that once the human being has become contaminated and is moving progressively into inferiority in relation to the environment, an attitude cannot be constant. If it is a statement of the human value, and that value is progressively declining, no attitude can be valid except for the one particular relationship with environment which calls it into being, and for the one particular occasion. If an identical aspect of the environment is again presented to the human being, and he has changed in the interim, then his relationship with the environment has changed and he must take a new attitude. So that attitudes are subject to incessant variation.

RELATIVE SPONTANEITY.

The other consideration is that the relative spontaneity with which the human being can arrive at an attitude must depend upon the spontaneity of interaction between the cells of the bodily system. If the attitude is to state the self-value of the human being, it is not sufficient for it to speak for one part of the bodily system. Every cell, and the capacity of all of them to react as a complete organism, must be represented in the attitude. If the harmony of interaction between the cells, therefore, is spontaneous, the taking of an attitude will be equally so. But to the extent that the capacity for spontaneous interaction has been infringed, so the taking of an attitude will lack spontaneity.

The attitude, however, cannot lack adequacy until the human being is passing into degeneration and becomes unable either to cognise or appreciate his own bodily condition in relation to the environment. But that is the point where it becomes necessary for attitudes to be dictated to him. In all earlier stages where he is able to take an attitude, it must be an adequate attitude for his particular bodily condition. It is the aware-

ness of inferiority which makes this so. The human being retains a full awareness of the progressive decline, through the capacity for feeling. And in just so far as any impression from the environment induces an intense or mild degree of feeling, he is able to assess his degree of inferiority to the impression. And the attitude will embody that assessment of inferiority, so that the human being is under no risk of resorting to a response which his weakened bodily condition lacks the capacity or capability to carry out.

ATTITUDES IN THE STATE OF TRUTH

INSTINCTIVE ATTITUDES.

If the different kinds of attitudes are examined in the light of the points analysed in the preceding chapter, each kind can be seen against the background of its particular bodily condition. First, the attitude which the human being takes when he can effect an equality with the environment out of his own bodily resources. This is strictly an instinctive attitude. The stage of human decadence represented by present-day life is so far advanced, and the human being has been habitually allied with such an infinite variety of compensations, that few of his attitudes are instinctive, and it is difficult to give an example except in those which relate to his bodily functions.

If one of these is taken, however, and all its implications analysed, it will be possible to gain an understanding of what the more instinctive human being's attitudes would be. We may use the example of the action of breathing. In some

cases at the present time even this has been intellectualised or become a matter of dictation. Certain scientific rulings as to how breathing should be carried on have been laid down, and prescriptions have been incorporated in some codes of physical development. The majority of human beings, however, still breathe as their bodily conditions determine them, and if we consider the breathing of a man who is taking, say, a country walk, we shall be able to follow his attitudes to his action of breathing as the environment presents him with varying aspects of itself, to which he has varying degrees of inferiority. This will still not be an exact example, because the human being will be relying upon clothes as compensation for his general bodily weakness, and these will affect his breathing. They will not invalidate the example, however.

If the man is walking easily along a level road, his breath comes with effortless ease and in a rhythm which puts no stress upon his bodily resources as a whole. No memory of any past experience plays a part in the action. He does not think about breathing and exercise care to do it as he has learned it should be done. That is, it is not a performance of skill. Neither does

any other factor than the environment and his own resources enter into the action. It is relatively spontaneous, and nothing but his body's cognition of how to carry on its organic functions guides the man.

INSTINCTIVE ATTITUDES CHANGE WITH BODILY CHANGES.

But if in his walk the man comes to a steep hill and begins to climb it, there will be a change. It is important to note first that this change is one of his relationship with the environment. In the level road the environment may be accepted as presenting to him an aspect of itself with which he was easily able to establish an equality. That is, it induced only a mild degree of feeling in him and, being on terms of comparative equality with it, he had not arrived at any acute awareness of inferiority. But when the road takes on a steep gradient, this comparative equality is lost. And with the increase of inferiority, there is an increase in the degree of feeling.

Here a change in the instinctive attitude can be seen. The first indication that the attitude has changed will be a change in the rhythm of the man's steps and the rhythm of his breathing. In

the present-day human being the mind would soon come into play. The man would become mentally aware of the gradient, of his changed step, and of the necessity for more effort in breathing. But the change takes place before the mind comes into play—it is, in fact, the change which brings about the mental alertness.

INSTINCTIVE ATTITUDES CHANGE WITH CHANGES IN ENVIRONMENT.

Yet for such a change to have taken place, a full awareness of the changed conditions must have been imparted to the body and a decision taken to change the rhythm of step and breathing. That is to say, the body must have become aware of a greater degree of inferiority in relation to the changed aspect of the environment, and with the awareness the cells must have set up an increased demand for supplies of energy-value through the blood-stream.

It is here that the instinctive bodily intelligence would take an attitude. Its assessment of self-value in relation to the changed aspect of the environment states that there are not sufficient resources of energy-value available to meet the change and maintain the rhythm of the step and

breathing. It is aware, however, that there are resources available for the man to climb the hill without external assistance, provided the change of rhythm is instituted. Having taken this attitude, it reduces the tempo of the step and increases the tempo of the respirations. That is to say, it carries out the action relevant to the attitude it has taken.

We may assume that as the most resistant point of the gradient is met, even these changes are not sufficient, but that the body still has resources to meet what is, in effect, a still further change in the aspect presented by the environment. Again the body must take an attitude, and as a result the form of the limb movement is changed. From swinging his legs out almost unbent, the man begins to climb with deeply bent knees, and the body begins to reject some of the waste matter which encumbers its movements, in the form of perspiration.

INSTINCTIVE ATTITUDES INDEPENDENT OF EXPERIENCE, MEMORY, MIND.

All these changes can be brought about without the mind coming into play in any way. We can easily think of a man so absorbed in his thoughts of events remote from his present environment

that he would be walking without any mental consideration. Yet in the given circumstances all the changes of movement and rhythm and tempo of the bodily functioning would be carried out, if the particular environmental conditions were met with. We should say that the man modified his step, his breathing and the actions of his pores quite instinctively. All the attitudes taken by his body in order that decisions as to the changes in action could be made were therefore taken instinctively, and this description of attitude is totally independent of experience, memory, mind, or intellectual skills.

The extremely important point to be noted in this is that the instinctive attitude always, as it were, prepares the bodily system for the energy call which is to be made upon it. All action—that is, all bodily movements—represent the expenditure of energy resources. The realisation of the necessity for action which is constituted in the bodily attitude to an aspect of the environment is, in effect, a preparation for that expenditure of energy. So that where an expenditure of energy results from an attitude taken by the bodily system, the preparation takes place within the bodily system itself.

INSTINCTIVE ATTITUDE: ITS PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS.

Just how important this is can be understood if the physiological process of taking an attitude and carrying out action is analysed. For instance, in the case of the man who is climbing a hill without using his mind. The preponderant responsibility for his movements lies with his legs and back. That is to say, those parts are making a greater call upon the energy-value of the blood-stream than the remainder of the bodily system. And the greater the effort involved in the movements, the greater the call upon the blood-stream will be.

But in these circumstances, the conditions in the tissues of those limbs are different from the conditions in repose. For instance, all the blood-vessels are distended to carry the additional blood-flow which the movements demand. When the man begins to climb the steeper part of the hill and needs to expend still more energy, there is a still more supplemented blood-flow and a still greater distension of the blood-vessels. Equally with his lungs, in breathing. The greater the effort, the quicker and deeper the respiration. This means that the tissue of the lungs, with its

myriads of blood-vessels, must distend more and more as the effort becomes greater.

Relating this to the attitude to carry out the more vigorous and additional movements: since the attitude is a bodily one, the call for action, although it is primarily made by the new aspect of the environment represented by the greater steepness of the hill, comes from within the body as far as the action is concerned. That is to say, the demands made upon the bodily tissues to carry a greater stress are not made until they themselves have self-consciously taken the attitude that a greater stress must be met. They are not made, therefore, until the tissues are ready to undergo that greater stress.

INSTINCTIVE ATTITUDES EMERGE FROM WITHIN.

It may be said that the whole process of subjecting the body to stresses is carried out in the proper natural sequence. The body itself and all its functions unfold and move outwards from within. Growth, for instance, is not brought about from without. It is the realisation of the innermost tendencies of the organism. It follows that movement should take the same course; that it should be incepted within the bodily system

itself and culminate outwards into the limb movements. Where the action is the result of an attitude taken by the bodily system, this is so. The need for action arises in a change in the environment, the body takes the attitude that the action must be carried out, and impels the bodily system as one co-ordinated unit to put the action into effect. As a result no undue stress falls upon any bodily part. By the time the additional blood-flow reaches the tissues, wherever they are located in the bodily system, the tissues are prepared and fit to meet it. No strain can result from such a process. Whatever tissues, such as veins, have to bear the additional stress, have joined in the call for that stress, and are, therefore, adjusted to it.

INTELLECTUAL ATTITUDE: INTERFERENCE FROM WITHOUT.

How different this process—resulting from an instinctive attitude—is, from that resulting when an intellectually directed attitude is taken, can be understood if an example of an intellectual attitude is taken and compared.

It may be supposed that the man who is climbing the hill was directing his mind upon his movements and had learned that when climbing a hill

he needed to breathe more quickly and deeply. Out of such knowledge, without waiting for his body to make the demand, he intellectually decides to breathe more quickly and deeply. He takes the additional air into his lungs. This demands the expansion of the lungs as though they were carrying an additional flow of blood. But there has been no call from within. This must mean that there is no additional flow of blood ready to support the distended tissues. The blood will not answer the distension of the lungs until the cells themselves make the call upon them as a result of the greater stress to which they become subjected. There is, therefore, a fraction of time during which there has been distension without support. The natural process has been reversed. Instead of the blood-vessels being prepared to distend and then meeting the additional blood-flow easily and naturally, they are distended first and the blood rushes in in answer to their distension—not in answer to the direction of the mind. Obviously strain is brought about in such a process. This will be understood more clearly when intellectual attitudes are examined in more detail.

INSTINCTIVE ATTITUDE: WHOLE BODILY SYSTEM
REPRESENTED.

Another important point about the instinctive attitude is that it represents not only the whole of the bodily system, but the bodily system as a whole. No movement can ever be carried out by the bodily system which does not represent the whole of the system. The energy capacity of the parts is derived from one source, the value of the blood-flow, and since that flow—the circulation—is carried on by an unintermittent process of movement, the energy capacity of any part is not vested in that part. A man has strength in his arm, not because it has a particular shape and construction, but because all its cells are being unintermittently visited by the stream of blood with its energy value. That is to say, the arm has no constant strength, but strength is constantly imparted to it. Similarly with every other part of the bodily system. When, therefore, a particular expenditure of energy is carried out through any one limb, it expends not its own energy but the energy of the blood-flow. And as the blood-flow is in incessant movement throughout the whole system, the additional blood used in expending

additional energy through any limb must be derived from the system as a whole.

INSTINCTIVE OR INTELLECTUAL ATTITUDES: DECIDED
BY BLOOD-VALUE.

Now, since every manifestation of the human being—the general manifestation of being alive at all—is an expenditure of energy, every manifestation must depend on the blood-flow. Therefore the manifestation of intelligence must depend on the blood-flow. The taking of an instinctive attitude is a manifestation of intelligence by the bodily system, and it must therefore depend on the blood-flow.

But in saying an attitude is dependent on the blood-flow for the intelligence it represents, it is not intended to imply that the blood-flow is the seat of the intelligence—that is, the consciousness of an organism. What is meant is that the blood-flow is the medium of distribution of the consciousness of an organism as a whole. The intelligence of any organism must be the capacity for expressing life, which is vested in the totality of the bodily cell-system. And for this total capacity to be expressed in the attitudes and manifestations of the organism, there must be a com-

plete interaction between all cells. There must, therefore, be a means of communication between all cells. The blood-flow fulfils this function of communication in a double sense. It distributes the material value of nourishment from the digestive organs to every bodily part—that is, to all cells—and it also communicates the self-awareness of all cells through the co-ordinating nervous systems in the body.

It may be said, therefore, that the blood carries on the one hand the material values imparted to the bodily system, and on the other the energy values which the bodily system has the capacity to express.

It is in this sense that the expression is used—the instinctive attitudes depend on the blood-flow. At its basis the intelligence of any bodily system must always derive from every part and every function, as they are co-ordinated for self-manifestation and the meeting of the environment. But as the blood-flow is the medium by which that intelligence is stated in terms of intelligent and energetic manifestation, it provides a convenient basis for illustration, to say that the attitudes and manifestations depend upon the blood-flow.

It follows that the taking of an attitude must be

something done by the whole bodily system, and not by any one part of it. But since no cell of the bodily system could remain alive except by receiving the constant visitation of the blood-stream, and it is from the blood-stream that the energy to take an attitude must come, the attitude must, as it were, represent the voice of all cells as one. The attitude of every cell in the system is incorporated. And every cell in the system must, equally, take part in every subsequent action, because a preponderant supply of blood to produce a particular energy-expenditure through any one limb or part can only be given at the expense of the system generally.

INTELLECTUAL ATTITUDES: BODILY SYSTEM DISPROPORTIONATELY REPRESENTED.

It will be seen later that where an intellectual attitude is taken and some manifestation follows, this is not so. The whole bodily system will still be represented in the attitude, but it will not be represented as a whole, because some skill must be involved in an intellectual attitude and a skill can be imparted only to a particular part of the bodily system. That particular part will, therefore, be disproportionately represented in the attitude.

INSTINCTIVE ATTITUDE REPRESENTS BODILY VALUE
AT THE MOMENT.

This raises another point, which is that the instinctive attitude represents the value of the bodily system at the moment in which the attitude is taken. In the case of the man climbing the hill, no change would take place in his bodily attitude if he were able to continue walking up the hill with the same ease as along the level road. That is to say, while his bodily value plus the action of easy walking is equal to the environment, no need for a change of attitude arises. It is only when the relationship with the environment changes with the changing slope of the ground that a different attitude becomes necessary.

The bodily value then, although it will not have changed in itself, is less equal to the environment as represented by the hill. If the man's body did not take the attitude that more vigorous action than easy walking was necessary, the speed of his movements would be gradually decreased as he climbed the hill, until ultimately he would come entirely to a stop, like a motor-car whose horsepower at a certain gearing is insufficient to carry its weight up the hill. But if there could con-

ceivably be a gradual increase in the man's bodily value as the gradient increased, he would continue up the hill at the same speed with the same relative expenditure of energy—just as when there were reserves of horse-power in a motor-car, the gradual opening of the throttle would enable the car to maintain its speed as the gradient steepened.

It is, therefore, the relative value of the man's bodily resources which determines the change in his attitude—and it must be the relative value of his resources at the moment in which a change becomes necessary, and which is the deciding factor in carrying out the change. If that value were greater, there would be no necessity for a change of attitude. If it had been less, the effort involved in walking along the level road would have been greater. And it would not help the man to climb the hill if he had been in a more energetic and vigorous state on some previous occasion. Nor would it make it more difficult that he had been less energetic at some time previously. It is his actual value from moment to moment in relation to the gradient as it changes from moment to moment that will determine his bodily attitude and, therefore, the degree of effort he expends upon climbing the hill.

INSTINCTIVE ATTITUDES : NO CONSCIOUSNESS OF
TIME AND SPACE.

The importance of this point lies in the fact that no consciousness of time or space values can be involved in instinctive attitudes. They are not related to any past experience or future anticipation. The man would not climb more vigorously on the lower slopes of the hill because the hill was steeper higher up. That would require an intellectual appreciation of a future environment. Nor would he climb less vigorously because he had been on a level road earlier. That would require appreciation of a past environment. And it is assumed throughout that the man's mind is wholly occupied with considerations totally unrelated to his present relationship with the environment.

The only changes that can be brought about in his attitude must result from feeling, induced by his becoming relatively more inferior to his environment as the gradient of the hill increases. Feeling cannot be induced by a past relationship with environment. There can be an intellectual memory of feeling, but no actual feeling. For instance, when a man remembers some suffering

he had undergone in the past, no matter how clearly he may remember the ordeal, there is no possible means by which the suffering could be actually reproduced by remembering it. In highly imaginative human beings there might be a form of suffering in remembering previous suffering, but it would be purely imaginative and a different form of suffering, not a reproduction of the first suffering, which constituted the experience which provides the memory. There can, in fact, never be any true reality in anything having a past value. That could only be if the condition of the bodily system were constant, and we know that, far from being constant, it changes from moment to moment. It is therefore, in effect, a different human being who remembers from the one who underwent the experience he recalls.

Equally, a future relationship with environment cannot induce feeling in the present. It can bring about a reasoned expectation of feeling, but not actual feeling, and an expectation must be intellectual, since it can only be arrived at by a reasoning process and on the basis of a past experience. Equally no consciousness of a space-value can be attached to an instinctive attitude. If only the present can be involved, only the one point of the

environment with which the man is in actual contact can affect him. Any other points removed in space would also be removed in time, as far as his relation with them was concerned.

At first consideration this may appear to be labouring the obvious, but when intellectual attitudes are considered later, its vital significance will become clear. It will be seen that all the human being's conceptions of reality can be warped by past memories and future anticipations influencing his attitude to environment at any given moment.

INSTINCTIVE ATTITUDES TRUTHFUL AND REAL.

To sum up as far as the analysis has been taken, the instinctive attitude is called into being by the degree of feeling induced by a particular degree of inferiority to a particular aspect of the environment. It is an assessment of the human being's present value in relation to the environment, it is a preparation for action to follow easily and naturally, it represents the whole bodily system as one co-ordinated unit, and involves no use of memory or the reasoning faculty. It is logical to call such an attitude a truthful attitude. There has been endless questioning and consideration to give rulings as to what is truth for human beings. But the

conclusions have always rested upon premises which were, in effect, opinions advanced by the truth seekers.

Here is a basis in which it is not necessary for opinions to play a part. The sum total of human life is expression of the life-power in relation to environment. And in taking an instinctive attitude, nothing but the value of the human life-power as represented in any human being and the particular relationship in which he stands to the environment at any given moment is involved. No other human being takes any part in it, nothing is added to or taken away from the human being's own natural resources, no artificialisation is possible, no intellectual consideration can affect it. The attitude truly represents the human being and truthfully expresses what he is. Equally any action resulting from it must truthfully express the human being's worth in relation to the environment, and his conception of himself and his environment in carrying out such action must represent an awareness of actual reality.

ATTITUDES IN THE STATE OF APPARENT TRUTH

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES.

We may now consider the intellectual attitude. Strictly, there is no such thing as an intellectual attitude—only an intellectualised attitude. Underlying and determining all intellectualised attitudes the bodily system must play its part. This may not be immediately obvious. Human beings have come to be so complicatedly intellectualised that it is sometimes difficult to see the bodily determination beneath their attitudes in the present day. Yet if a few examples are taken, it will be seen that there can be no human manifestation whatsoever, except through the medium of and the determination by the body.

CONCEPTION OF PSYCHICAL APART FROM BODY, THE OUTCOME OF INTELLECT.

Human life, as with all life, only begins with the environment. If there were no environment there could be no growth and unfoldment, no

manifestation of life, because there could be no external phenomena in respect of which a consciousness could have a self-awareness, and no body of resistance against which the material part of the organism could take form. But the consciousness, whether as self-awareness or awareness of the environment, can only be exercised through the senses. And the senses are attributes of the bodily system. Nothing, therefore, can be perceptible to the human being, except through his bodily system. And this being so, the bodily system must qualify all apprehension.

At basis this means that a human being can only know of things as his bodily system permits him. Since he can only know of things as his bodily system permits, and he can only reason in respect of what he knows, all reasoning must have its basis in the bodily system. Another point is that, since the consciousness can only be exercised through the bodily system, all urges and conceptions arising in the consciousness must be affected by the bodily needs and wants. This may be thought of in another way. Since life itself is no more than the expression of the life-power towards the environment, and the means by which this expression is gained is the human bodily system, to live is to

do no more than satisfy the needs and wants of the bodily system. That is to say, every urge and conception which finds a place in the consciousness must be, either directly or indirectly, the expression of some bodily need or want.

This does not mean that human life is wholly physical in the sense in which the term "physical" is understood today. It merely means that the psychical value of life cannot be considered apart from consideration of the body : that the body is as psychical as the consciousness, and that modern thought is moving in a fallacious direction when it attempts to devaluate the body in estimating reality and man's significance in the universe. Yet this erroneous trend of thought is the inevitable outcome of the arising of the intellect, and gives a measure of the degree to which intellectualised attitudes are divorced from reality—that is, from actuality.

ARISING OF INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES.

To trace the beginning of intellectualised attitudes it is necessary to see how they became necessary to the human being. It will be simplest to follow the example of the man climbing a hill, and to see how his instinctive attitudes might

become inadequate to guide him as to possible means of climbing the hill. He will continue to adopt instinctive attitudes while he can ascend the hill by the utilisation of his own natural resources alone.

But suppose that the point is reached where the gradient, or the difficulties of the way, become so steep that he can go no further. Now he is faced with two alternative procedures : either he must be defeated by the hill, or he must use some means of supplementing his own resources. We may suppose that as a first measure he takes a stick from a tree beside the road and uses it for leverage and as a walking-stick to help him on the way.

COMPENSATION DIRECTS BODY IN ITS USE.

But he can only gain help from the stick by using it in certain ways. If he waves it in the air, for instance, it will be of no assistance whatever. If he holds it by the middle it will be of little help. To supplement his own resources adequately, he must use it with a certain degree of skill. But he could only have a skill in its use if he had had a previous experience of using a stick in similar circumstances, or had learned how to use it from someone else who had had such an experience.

If we consider the attitudes which determined the taking of the stick and its use, it will be possible to see how they differ from instinctive attitudes. In the first place, the body must have taken an instinctive attitude that it was wholly inferior to the hill. That is, it must have realised its incapacity to overcome the hill as an aspect of environment. Here there is a state of opposition : on the one hand, the urge from within to surmount the hill ; on the other, the inadequacy of the bodily resources to do so. Then there is an instinctive attitude that some outside assistance must be obtained, and an attitude of vigilance to discover the means of outside assistance, and finally, when the means have been ascertained, an attitude of decision to take them.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES : NO SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

At this point the human being ceases to be self-sufficient in any degree, and since instinct is merely the expression of self-value, it cannot wholly dominate the human being in the use of the stick. It must accept the direction of the stick itself as to how a stick can be used. So the attitude towards the environment taken by the human being once he has grasped the stick does not represent him

wholly. It represents him as he is, subject to limitations in the use of the stick. His behaviour in using the stick, therefore, is not purely his own actions.

Equally, however, the stick cannot dominate him wholly. It, in turn, must be subject to the limitations for use which the man's bodily system determines. If, for instance, the man's arms were suffering from a stiffness, the stick would be used differently from what would be the case if there were no stiffness. Any peculiarity of those parts of the man's bodily system involved in using the stick will exercise a particular determination in the use of the stick.

That is to say, two factors are now involved in the man's attitude to the environment: his own bodily determination and the stick. But the man will be affected by the stick in exact accordance with his skill in using it. Without skill he would tend to carry out natural movements, and, since it is unlikely these would be best adapted to using the stick, would fail to utilise it to its utmost possibility. This means, his bodily determination would play the predominant part, and he would not be relying on the stick to the maximum extent. But if he were skilful, he would know all the

possible uses of the stick. Memories of previous experiences in using one would inform him of the modifications of his natural movements best adapted to the situation. He would then defer to the limitations imposed by the stick to the utmost extent consonant with utilising it for his purpose.

This means that the direction of his memories of past experiences would be the dominant factor in the man's attitude to the environment in the particular circumstances. His bodily determination would remain the basic factor. But for that he would not have taken the stick. But having determined him to do so, the bodily determination passes under the direction of the memories of previously using the stick. It must be said, therefore, that his attitude is intellectualised. His natural intelligence is subordinated to a skill deriving from the repetition of experiences culminating in a formalised memory.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES : WHAT THEY CONSTITUTE.

It is important to note just what an attitude in these circumstances constitutes. Since the bodily determination is represented in it, it carries the value of the human being. But it does not carry

it exactly as the instinctive attitude did ; the whole bodily value is not necessarily represented, because it may be that the stick limits the extent to which the full bodily value can be expressed in its use. The human being no longer has full freedom of expressing his energy value. If the stick directs it, he must repress some quota of his energy. So though the bodily system is represented in the man's attitude, it cannot be taken that it is wholly represented. It is merely the determining factor. Then the stick itself is represented, both directly and indirectly. Directly in so far as it is actually to be used, to have its resources linked with those of the human being to fulfil a purpose of the human being; indirectly, since the human being's memory of the previous use of a stick will play a directing part.

INTELLECTUAL ATTITUDES : CONSCIOUSNESS OF TIME-VALUES.

It is important to note here that a consciousness of time-value comes into play. The human being's skill rests upon past memories. And a full consciousness of a time-value must come into play when the man adopts such an attitude, because he is relying upon the results of those past experiences

to direct his present behaviour. He is in effect reasoning : " To use the stick helped me on the previous occasion, so I can expect that it will help me now, if I use it similarly to the way I used it before." That is, he is definitely aware of a distinction between the present and the past occasions and must, therefore, be able to appreciate a lapse of time between the two, and also be able to conceive the lapse in dimensional terms—a long lapse or a short lapse.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES : DECEPTIVE AND FORMAL.

It can be seen here, that an element of deceptiveness must enter into the attitude which the man adopts. The memory relates to the bodily condition which characterised him at the time of the previous experience. But the bodily condition is not constant, and would have given a different determination on the occasion of first using the stick than it will give in the present instance. Yet the memory of behaving under the previous determination is to qualify the present attitude. Which means that the man's present attitude will not be wholly true to his present bodily condition.

It can also be seen that an element of formalism

enters in. The man's attitude will not be free from all restriction except that of the relationship with the environment. It must, to an extent, follow the pattern set by the behaviour which is outlined in his memory. In the one instance of using the stick, this formalism could do little to rob the man's manifestations of variety; but even so there is a certain channelisation, and it is possible to see that with a progressive intellectualisation human life and manifestation must lose in variety and freedom of expression.

This channelisation will also be represented in the body. Just as in the instinctive attitude, it is through the medium of the blood-flow that the energy to take an intelligent attitude must come. But in the instinctive attitude, the whole bodily system was equally represented. It makes no difference that the subsequent action might have involved the particular use of one bodily part—such as an arm. The attitude taken was not specifically that the arm must be used, but that action was necessary to make up the inferiority which the particular degree of feeling indicated. Also, in deciding that action would be necessary, the body was expressing the intelligence of the cell-system as a whole, so that the needs of the

system and the capacity of the cells to support the action decided upon were expressed in the attitude. All the impetus, therefore, to take the attitude and carry out the subsequent action culminated outwards from within. The impulse spoke for the whole bodily system as one entity. No other factor than the relationship with the environment and the energy-value of the blood-flow played a part.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES : DIRECTION FROM
PAST EXPERIENCES.

But now there is a difference. First, the memory comes into play to direct the bodily determination in the taking of an attitude. And the memory relates specifically to the particular part of the body which was specifically involved in the use of the stick—that is, the arm. Instead of the bodily system being equally represented throughout, therefore, the arm is specifically represented. But the blood-flow can only speak for the bodily system as a whole. The specific representation of the arm must be superimposed upon the determination of the blood-flow. And such a superimposition must be carried out in the opposite of the natural direction. Instead of—as with the in-

stinctive determination—flowing outwards from the inner consciousness to culminate as action, the memory direction must move inwards from the arm to the inner consciousness. This means that the normal processes of the inner consciousness must be adapted to meet the direction which the memory gives.

In other words, the inner consciousness is subjected to a particular bias from a bodily part, instead of continuing as the voice of the whole system co-ordinated into one organic whole. And this bias represents not the present relationship with the environment, but the past relationship when the experience was acquired, of using the stick on a previous occasion. So that in so far as the memory is represented in his attitude, the man is living, to a degree, in the past. It might be said that the past has cut a channel into the man's life, through which it can continue to direct his behaviour. Again, it can be seen that with the multiplication of such memory directions (that is, with the gradual intellectualisation) the human being will come to live more and more in the past. And since there is an element of deceptiveness in all such direction, his attitudes will grow more and more deceptive as to his true relationship with the environment.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES : DISPROPORTION OF BODILY PARTS.

Besides the formalism and channelisation, the memory-directed attitude must also have an element of disproportion in so far as it represents the arm particularly. If the memory is constituted in a modification of the arm resulting from the earlier experience of using the stick, it cannot apply to the whole bodily system. And since the memory was not produced by action which had culminated outwards from within, it does not represent an instinctive potentiality of the bodily system. It is rather a restriction than an extension of the bodily tendencies—or, in other words, it is something alien which the arm has acquired, but which the remainder of the body does not share.

Necessarily, the body is properly proportioned when it merely fulfils the inner tendencies towards unfoldment and growth. Any modification imposed upon one part of it from without must, therefore, bring about a disproportion. And any attitude taken by a human being in which such a disproportion is represented must reflect that disproportion.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES : DISTORTION OF REALITY.

The importance of this, as also of the deceptive element and the introduction of a past value, is that they invalidate the human being's conception of reality to the extent that they are represented in his attitude. An attitude is objective as well as subjective. That is, it envisages the environment as well as the human being who takes it. The reality of a human being's life and his relation with any particular aspect of the environment is the relative equality of the human being's value as opposed to the value of the environment, at the exact moment in which the particular aspect of the environment is presented to him. The degree of equality will state the actual extent to which the human being's bodily system is giving his life-power scope for full and free expression.

There can be no other true reality. But if any attitude taken by the human being is directed by a memory of an occasion when his bodily condition was other than it is at the moment of taking the attitude, it cannot be said that he has a true grasp of reality. Equally, if it represents a disproportion applied to the fulfilment of the human

being's inner tendencies to unfoldment and growth, his attitude will also to that extent lack a true grasp of reality.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES : SUMMING UP.

To sum up the intellectualised attitude so far as it has now been considered and illustrated by the example of using the stick for assistance in climbing the hill:

First of all, every intellectualised attitude must rest upon a consciousness that the full resources of the bodily system are unequal to coping with the aspect of the environment with which the human being is presented. In that consciousness it turns to some external factor as a means of supplementing the inadequate bodily resources. Once such a support has been accepted, the attitude of the human being to the environment must represent the thing from which help is derived, as well as the human being. But as the adequacy of using outside assistance rests upon a skill in the act of using it, a memory of a past experience must come into play. That is, two factors are involved in the attitude : the bodily

determination and the memory of a past experience.

The direction by a memory brings a consciousness of time-values into operation and also attaches a past value to the attitude, so that the human being in taking it is not living wholly in the present. As the bodily condition varies from moment to moment, this introduces an element of deception. Again, the present attitude, since it is under the direction of behaviour remembered from the past, is to an extent formalised and channelised. And since the memory is located in a particular part of the human being's bodily system and is not representative of it as a whole, it is based on a disproportion. Finally, the intellectualised attitude represents a degree of loss of true reality in the human being's conception of himself and his environment.

The example which has so far been followed is merely one simple example used to illustrate the basic differences between the instinctive attitude and the intellectualised attitude. But if the intellectualised attitude is considered in relation to life at the present time, it will be seen that we have

become almost wholly intellectualised as far as our responses to environment are concerned.

In expressing our inner bodily tendencies we remain largely instinctive. Generally speaking, there has been no interference with the bodily processes. Yet there are exceptions where even this has happened. We know, for instance, of the advice given by someone that all food should be masticated a certain number of times before it is swallowed. And there are people who accept that advice and try to follow it. If the analysis of intellectualised attitudes is applied to the attitude of the human being who does so, it will be easy to discover the causes of his adopting it.

Then there is the widespread habit of assisting the rejective processes of the body by the uses of aperients. Or again, there is the acceptance of scientific pronouncements as to the method and rhythm of breathing. There have also been attempts to regulate and modify other processes, such as circulation, walking, running, and so on.

It is not possible to analyse all of the attitudes which go to bring about the readiness to accept such modifications of the natural processes, but there are three aspects of intellectualised attitudes which it will be worth while to consider in detail.

Any student will be able to analyse the basis and explanation of other examples for himself. The three it is proposed to deal with are the intellectualised attitude to nourishment, to exercise, and between human beings as fellow-beings.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES TO NOURISHMENT

Nourishment, of whatever form, whether air, food or drink, is a fundamental necessity of life. It is taken by the human being from the environment, but there is this significant difference between nourishment and all other supports which man takes from his surroundings—nourishment does not remain dissociated from the bodily system. Its intake is provided for by the natural processes of the organism, it is assimilated into the bodily system, and, in fact, the bodily system is no more than nourishment which has been subjected to tendencies of the human life-power.

INSTINCTIVE ATTITUDES TO NOURISHMENT.

Nourishment cannot, therefore, be thought of as one of the means by which the human being establishes an equality with the remainder of the

environment, once he has become inferior to it. He does need nourishment to maintain his equality, but he needs it in just the same way as he needs the power which constitutes him a living thing. This being so, the taking of nourishment is not essentially intellectual, as the taking of other compensating factors from the environment must be. It is possible, therefore, for the human being to be wholly instinctive in his choice of nourishment. That is, he can have instinctive attitudes to nourishment, and he would be in a higher state of bodily vigour than he enjoys today.

In an instinctive attitude to nourishment, as in all other instinctive attitudes, only the net value of the human being in relation to the environment at the time of taking the attitude would influence him. His attitude, and therefore his subsequent choice, would be determined by the energy-value of the blood-flow alone. Only the bodily cells which were to ultimately receive the nourishment value would state the need to take the attitude. But it is important to note that nourishment is itself a form of energy expression, and with varying forms of nourishment varying degrees of the capacity to assimilate energy expressions are necessary in the human being.

ARISING OF INTELLECTUALISATION.

In the higher bodily condition, where he would be able to take instinctive attitudes, his bodily cell-system would be able to cope with commensurately powerful forms of nourishment. They would not be too potent for him because of their being in their natural and untreated state. But it is understandable that when the human being's powers of resistance and self-assertion as an organism have become effete, as is the case where his attitudes have been intellectualised to a considerable extent, he would lack the capacity to assimilate such forms of nourishment, and it would become necessary to subject them to processes of cooking, drying, and so forth. But this means that the human being's attitudes to nourishment would also have been intellectualised.

It is extremely important to point out here, however, that the fact of nourishment being incorporated into the constitution of the bodily system means that once an intellectualised attitude to nourishment has been brought into being and acted upon, the effect would not be confined to one particular part of the bodily system, as is the case of modifications resulting from other ex-

periences. The nourishment would be assimilated by the organic bodily processes and, reduced to its essentials for the purposes of fulfilling the tendencies of the human life-power, distributed to every cell of the bodily system and incorporated into the cell constitution.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES TO NOURISHMENT: RESULTS.

So the effect of intellectualised attitudes to nourishment is of far greater significance than is the case with any other attitudes. It means that once such an attitude had been taken and had directed the human being's behaviour, even his instinctive attitudes would be subsequently qualified by it, and also that it would be incorporated into the bodily determination which underlay all subsequent attitudes whether intellectualised or not. It can be seen, therefore, how much greater a part in consolidating intellectualisation is played by intellectualised attitudes to nourishment than by intellectualised attitudes towards particular aspects of the environment, which only produce memory modifications of particular bodily parts. For this reason it is worth while to analyse what takes place in producing an intellectualised attitude to nourish-

ment, and what are the details of its subsequent effects.

It will be understood that the human being would not be impelled to the attitude that he was inferior to the natural and unprepared nourishment until he had already undergone some degree of intellectualisation of his bodily parts, and the process of thought had been instituted. Having reached that state, and being aware of a degree of feeling—that is, of awareness of inferiority—amounting to suffering, as the result of relying upon natural nourishments too strong for his weakened bodily condition, he would adopt the attitude that it was necessary to subject the natural nourishment to some form of preparation. But in once taking prepared nourishment, he would be bringing about a modification of his cells, because the cells are built up by the assimilated nourishment.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES DIRECTED BY CELL-MEMORY.

The memory, therefore, which constitutes the basis of the intellectualised attitude to nourishment would appertain to every cell alike. This means that when it next became necessary to take an

attitude towards nourishment, the memory which the cells had acquired of having previously taken the improper nourishment would direct the taking of the attitude. But this direction could only be given by the natural co-ordinating processes of the bodily system. That is, it would culminate outwards as an instinctive determination would do. It would, therefore, be incorporated into the bodily determination. That being so, it would appear to the human being to have the validity of an impulse from his own natural urges. As such, it would constitute a preference for the particular kind of nourishment it referred to, and once the attitude was taken and the preference indulged, the human being would derive a bodily sense of gratification from it through his sense of taste.

THE BRAIN AND INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES TO NOURISHMENT.

But beside the cell-memory of having assimilated the nourishment, there would be a brain-memory of the experience of having taken it. Through this brain-memory the human being would be able to recognise the nourishment in terms of thought. He would be able to recall the act of taking it and have an intellectual consciousness of the past value

attaching to the time of taking it. There is, therefore, as it were, a double direction in the forming of an attitude to take intellectually chosen nourishment : one, the direction of the cell-memory regarding the assimilation of the nourishment ; the other, the direction of the brain-memory regarding the occasion of having taken it.

In this can be seen the basis of all the preferences in nourishment—what are called “ tastes ”—which characterise the human being at the present time. As they are at present understood, tastes in nourishment appear fortuitous, often having no relation to experience that can be traced. Yet if there were not some call from the cell, no nourishment would be palatable to the human being. This can easily be seen in the cases of those who have become gourmets and connoisseurs of food. In their case, natural nourishment in its unprepared state would seem crude when intellectually considered. But also, their bodies would revolt and involve them in acute suffering if they overcame their prejudices and took the nourishment in its natural form. The cell modifications have become so complicated (actually, their cells have been so contaminated) that their bodily determination is one of aversion to such nourishment, and they have become too

weak to permit themselves to calculatedly override it.

On the other hand, those whose cell-systems are accustomed to simple and largely untreated nourishment would find the rich foods of the gourmet just as unpalatable. They would have a bodily aversion towards them, and if they calculatedly over-rode that aversion it would equally bring about bodily suffering, since the human beings would have imposed upon their cells a form of nourishment for which there had been no determination.

NEED FOR NOURISHMENT ANTICIPATED OR OVERRIDDEN BY BRAIN-MEMORY.

It may be said, therefore, that as far as forming attitudes to nourishment is concerned, there can only be an intellectual choice over a range of nourishments all equally adapted to the call from the cells. But where the intellectual memories override the bodily determination most frequently, in a state of human life such as is known today, is in respect of the times of supplying nourishment to the body. Advice has been given by scientists and others that food should be taken at stated intervals.

Then again, the routine of present-day life only permits the human being in many instances to find the leisure to take meals at definite and regular times. Often nourishment is taken merely for the sake of conviviality or sociability. It is, in fact, probable that most of the nourishment taken in the form of food and drink under present-day conditions is taken without a call from the body being set up for it. That is to say, human beings do not wait for their bodily systems to determine an attitude that nourishment is necessary. It is rather that, because they have had experiences of taking nourishment at certain times and under certain conditions, and the memories of those experiences have become part of their mentality, they take intellectualised attitudes that it is advisable, or fitting, or well-mannered, to repeat the experiences in a similar sequence or on similar occasions.

ILL-EFFECTS OF DIRECTION OF BRAIN-MEMORY.

Here the deleterious effect of intellectualised attitudes can be seen again. It is the bodily system which must receive and cope with the nourishment, yet when human beings follow up their intellectualised attitudes, the direct bodily determination is ignored. There is only an indirect

determination underlying the attitude, and it appertains not to the need for nourishment but to some other need. For instance, the human being who takes meals at stated intervals because his economic activities only leave him free at those times is answering the bodily need to be maintained generally by his employment—not a direct bodily need for nourishment. The man who takes a meal or drink as a social duty, because he is paying a visit, is doing so because of the bodily need to maintain the goodwill of those fellow-beings with whom he is in immediate contact.

The bodily determination must always be there in some form, but it is, perhaps, no exaggeration to say that conditions of life have become so complicated that it is the exception, today, for a human being to wait for a meal until his bodily system has taken a definite attitude that nourishment is necessary. Yet the very fact that the body has not set up a call for nourishment means that it has not finally assimilated the nourishment previously supplied. The bodily functions are still in the process of doing so, and then, as a result of the intellectualised attitude, fresh nourishment is introduced upon which the unprepared organs must reinstitute their processes.

It is not surprising that derangements and pathological conditions are so often set up in the organs. Nothing could be more calculated to consolidate the contamination and weakness which characterises the bodily conditions of human beings at the present time ; nothing could be more calculated to bring about a degenerate stupefaction of the bodily system, so blunting its natural sensitivity and vigorous freedom of energetic expression that the human being is fit for nothing but to submit blindly to the dictation of traditions, codes, ideas and theories.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES TO EXERCISE

Though perhaps less vital in its effects, the intellectualised attitude to exercise also has profound results. Actually, all exercise must be intellectualised. It results from the intellectualisation of the awareness of inferiority—of unfitness, for instance—and is an attempt to overcome that inferiority by applying memorised movements to the limbs.

INSTINCTIVE ATTITUDES TO ACTION.

If the human being were instinctive and answered only his bodily determination through action, the movements by which he combated his inferiority would be relatively spontaneous and would be wholly unchannelised. A particular feeling expressing the inferiority would arise in the body, the body would take an instinctive attitude that some action was necessary to make up the inferiority, and, without any calculation or formalism whatever, the human being would carry out the action.

An instance of this is yawning. The human being does not yawn because he has memorised the way to do so and the effects that will result. There is a clogging of the bodily cells which sets up feeling, and the yawn follows comparatively spontaneously, bringing muscles into play and stimulating the blood-flow to act upon the waste matter. Another instance is stretching after waking from sleep, and another, the quick, unmental scratching by which we combat a feeling of irritation in parts of the body. Were the human being was instinctive the much higher degree of bodily vigour he enjoyed would impel him to far

more energetic, frequent and varied movement than he undertakes at present, and his organic bodily processes would be freely and naturally facilitated.

There are instances of this in the actions of children. They carry out movements not with a definite purpose based on some experience, but merely as a response to their bodily urges. The very young infant kicks and flexes its limbs ; the growing child runs about, jumps and skips, in what, to the intellectualised adult human being, is a wholly aimless manner. Yet it is accepted that such relatively spontaneous movements have a vigour, liveness and grace which it is beyond the scope of adults to attain.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES TO EXERCISE.

Yet, although exercise only begins when the human being has reached the state where he is able to intellectualise his attitudes to movement, there is always a direct bodily determination underlying it. If, for instance, a human being felt perfectly fit and well—and assuming for the moment that in such a state he would have no urge from within to movement—he would never take the attitude that he needed to exercise himself. Whatever

memories he had regarding exercise would not be brought into play. His relationship with environment would seem satisfactory, and he would have no inclination to change it by stimulating his bodily state.

Instances are well known to everyone of men who, after long periods of following the routine of their lives without taking any exercise, as such, begin to feel continually jaded and unfit, and then, by becoming intellectually aware of that feeling, take the attitude that they must vary their routine to include some form of deliberate exercising.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES : REVERSAL OF NATURAL SEQUENCE OF BODILY PROCESSES.

Exercise, therefore, always has a direct bodily determination as its basis, but here the way in which the intellectualised attitude brings about a reversal of the natural order of cause and effect in the bodily processes becomes very clear. If the human being were more instinctive—more truly representative of his behaviour, of his natural tendencies—the first uncomfortable condition of ill-being would impel its own countering movements. But, as he has become today, man has lost the capacity to answer his bodily urges so

directly, even if his routine and the artificialised environment of civilisation permitted.

The awareness of ill-being can only, therefore, stimulate him mentally in the first instance. He begins to reason over his condition, and the linking of his bodily condition with particular memories brings about the attitude that he must take exercise. He may at some previous period, perhaps in his youth, have taken a course of exercises, or he may have read newspaper articles on the matter, or he may even consult a doctor, who advises him—in any event, some previous experience, either of his own or someone else's which he has learned, directs him to take the attitude. Then an attitude to a particular course of exercises is necessary. There may be a process of rejection and selection here, and again both bodily determination and experience will play their part.

For instance, if the man has found that his body is becoming fat, he will incline to exercises calculated to reduce that condition. If it is that his shoulders are becoming rounded, he will incline that way; and so on. But his memory will direct the selection on the basis of other considerations. The course of exercises must be within his means to afford; it must be carried out at the times and

under the conditions which the routine of his life permits, and they must be of such a nature as will not involve him in altercation or discredit with those fellow-beings whose good opinion he values. All these considerations will be represented in his attitude to various methods of taking exercise, qualifying the bodily determination. The final attitude of preference will be towards that method which most nearly meets the amalgam of need and wants.

INTELLECTUALISED MOVEMENTS IN EXERCISE DO
NOT MEET BODILY NEEDS.

But when the man begins to actually carry out the movements of the exercises, his intellectualised attitude to them will thwart much of their beneficial effect. The first factor will be that, contrary to the natural order of the processes of bringing about bodily movements, each will be incepted from outside of the man himself. The impetus to take some exercising movements originally arose within him, but the specific movements he makes are applied to him. If he has selected a schedule drawn up by a specialist in physical culture, the form, nature and timing of the movements will be specified.

For instance, if one exercise is a repeated raising of the arms above the head, there is no direct need of the man's body impelling him to reach repeatedly above his head. What has happened is that the expert, by observation, perhaps upon himself, or perhaps on other pupils, or perhaps by an intellectual study of the muscle formation of the body, has reasoned that a repetition of that movement will have certain effects. So that the exercises exist already, as it were, in the abstract, and the man performing them is, in effect, placing them upon his body much as he would place a coat or some other form of protection. Except that in this instance the internal bodily processes are brought into play.

BODILY TISSUES UNPREPARED TO MEET MOVEMENTS IN EXERCISE.

But, as was shown earlier, there has been no preparation of the bodily tissues for this use of the bodily processes. When the man first lifts his arms above his head, the body has not taken the attitude that he should do so. The arms are lifted under intellectual direction. That is to say, instead of the blood-flow calling the limbs into action, the intellect applies a movement to the

limbs, and the additional blood-flow to support the movement must follow unnaturally when the cells make a call upon it to support the stress imposed upon them. At each stage of the movement there is, therefore, a time-lag between the effort involved and the supplying of the energy-value which makes the movement possible.

This must not be thought of as a measurable space of time. All it amounts to is a reversal of the natural impulse and effort to effort and impulse. Yet in a so subtly attuned mechanism as the human body this may mean much. It means that stresses fall where delicate tissues are unprepared. There is a risk of strain and lesion.

BODILY DISPROPORTIONS THROUGH DEVELOPMENT.

And there is still another aspect. We know that the supplemented blood-flow which supports all movements means a supplemented breaking-down of waste matter and depositing of the bodily value at the part involved in the movement. The repetition of a movement, therefore, means a repetition of this and, accordingly, a disproportionate building-up at that particular part. But since it is merely the movement and not the energy which is applied to the part, the additional energy

which brings about the disproportion can only have been supplied at the expense of the body as a whole. Also, the development which will ultimately result at the part will be a distortion of the man's natural tendencies to unfoldment. And once it has been brought about, that distortion will be represented in all future attitudes the man takes.

It will be understood that if a man had developed his arms and shoulders in this way, his attitude to, say, a gate in a field would be different from what it would have been if he had developed his legs instead. He would tend in the former instance to use his arms and shoulders to lever himself over the gate by vaulting ; in the latter he would tend to rely upon his legs instead of his arms. And if his attitude to the gate is qualified, his attitude to all other things will be similarly affected.

Even where a schedule of exercises was used which had been designed to exercise a more varied range of the muscles of the body, the channelising would still take place. It would not be so sharply defined, but nothing can alter the fact that the man taking the exercises is not the initiating factor in the movements themselves. He is merely accepting another man's initiation and applying

that to his body. In effect, and to a certain extent, he becomes the other man—the specialist.

So that in all exercising, the attitude not only to the issue of whether to take exercises or no, but also to the particular movements, is of vital importance. At the present time we have reached a point where it would be impossible for the average man to replace the movements of exercises by the natural movements of action, but if everything possible is done to eliminate the element of direction, the beneficial effects of the movements are gained to the maximum possible extent, and the deleterious effects of the channelising are reduced to a minimum. And by giving the first bias towards the freeing of natural tendencies, something of self-understanding will be gained and the later elimination of direction made more easy. If the attitude is made as nearly true as possible—that is, true to the body—the movements resulting from it must carry the value of the improvement.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES BETWEEN HUMAN BEINGS AS FELLOW- BEINGS

In considering attitudes as they affect the relations of human beings as fellow-beings, the whole range of social problems is involved. It is the attitudes of human beings to one another which bring about particular social conditions, although the conditions are not always directly or simply traceable to the attitudes which give rise to them.

INSTINCTIVE ATTITUDES SIMPLE ; INTELLECTUALISED
ATTITUDES COMPLICATED.

But again in this, it is always the intellectualisation of attitudes which brings about complications and problems. Societies would not be possible where only instinctive attitudes determined the actions of human beings. Then, the relations between one man and another would be on a basis purely of feeling, and would be reduced to the simple elements of fellow-sympathy and fellow-antipathy. There could be no competition since the resources of all action would lie within the human beings themselves. Each would find the means of establishing his equality with the environ-

ment in his own bodily system. There would be no reliance upon external factors, out of which a clash of interests could come into being.

But once external compensating factors have been used and men's attitudes to their environment as a whole have been intellectualised, the same must happen to the relations between man and man. The relations between them in the present-day conditions of life have been so complicated by intellectual considerations that definite attitudes are almost impossible. Each must be subject to compromise at innumerable points, often to the degree that they seem self-contradictory. Yet in the case of each single human being, there is always one definite element in his attitude—that is, his bodily determination.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES TO FELLOW-BEINGS :
BODY STILL REPRESENTED.

Until he abandons himself wholly to some form of dictation so that his particular bodily condition no longer plays any part in his behaviour, every human being has that fact of his particular bodily needs and wants inalienably providing a unique background for all his attitudes, no matter how much they may appear to fall into

line with those of others as being socially right and fitting.

For instance, two human beings who are doctors will take the common attitude that medicine is a valuable and worthy study, and that its practitioners should be entitled to the respect of the society. But if one of them has a bodily aversion to the sights, sounds and atmosphere of sickness, his conception of the dignity of the profession will differ from the conception of the other, who has no such aversion. And if their conceptions differ, their attitudes to one another and to others of the profession will differ fundamentally, although superficially they may both subscribe to the point of view that medicine is a highly reputable profession.

Similarly with the attitudes of one man to another. Intellectual considerations will direct the attitude, but always the underlying bodily condition of both must be the determining factor. This factor, however, is seldom taken into account in the attempts made to reconcile the differences which exist between man and man, and between groups of men, at the present time. With the gradually accumulating need of compensations men have built up an elaborate system of societies,

The net result of these societies has been to remove human beings ever further and further from direct contact with the environment. They have come to exist in an artificial environment which stands as a buffer between them and their natural environment—between them and the universe as a whole.

ENVIRONMENT MET THROUGH FELLOW-BEINGS, NOT
DIRECTLY AND TRULY.

Each human being no longer has to oppose either his bodily resources or skills directly to the forces of his natural surroundings. The aggregate resources of all who make up the societies have been organised, and the responsibility for meeting particular aspects of the environment for all concerned has been parcelled out to groups of specialists.

For instance, the clothes by which we make up our inferiority to climatic forces are made by a few and supplied to all. Food is cultivated and prepared by a few, protection against the bad and anti-social members of the community is provided by a few through the police and military forces, and so on over the whole range of compensations by which life is at present maintained.

This means that none of us is called upon to take

the infinite ranges of attitudes to the elemental forces of the universe which would otherwise be necessary. But it does not mean that man has found a means of maintaining life without meeting the whole of environment. It merely means that he has found a way of meeting it indirectly. His life continues to be, in essence, no more than the assertion of his life-power against the environment, and therefore the attitudes by which he assesses his relationship to his surroundings have not become superfluous to the fact of his being. They must still be taken, but because he has come to meet the environment through his fellows to a large extent, his attitudes to the natural environment must also be expressed through his attitudes to his fellows.

That is to say, with the complication of the compensating factors by which he lives, there has arisen a complication of the attitudes by which he assesses his relationship with his fellow-beings. On the one hand, he incessantly stands in need of the services of his fellow-beings: on the other, he is incessantly yielding services to them.

COMPENSATIONS NEVER TRULY SATISFYING.

If a true equality with the environment as a whole had been established by these means, such

relationships could be harmonious. But the contrary is the case. Human inferiority is always one step ahead of the support afforded by compensations. That is to say, the mutual service which men can afford to men is always one step behind their mutual need of service. Necessarily, there is always a degree of dissatisfaction, and that dissatisfaction can only be expressed in the attitudes of one man to another. There is competition for the apparent benefits society affords; there is criticism, mutual recrimination, suspicion, jealousy, envy, dislike, intolerance, hatred, and all the variety of other attitudes which we see in the relations of men today.

PRESENT-DAY ATTITUDES IGNORE BODILY DETERMINATION.

Incessant attempts are made to arrive at the basis and cause of these variations, and by their capability of reasoning, men have in many cases arrived at the intellectual explanations. Many are aware of the inequalities in the social system which bring about class and group discontentments. Yet they find that the remedies which they propound to meet these inequalities either fail or are opposed and rejected. It must always be so while only the

intellectual consideration is taken into account, and the bodily determination to particular attitudes is ignored.

The difficulty, apart from the fact that those who assess the inequalities do so on the basis of their own decadence or degeneration, is that life has become so intellectualised, the bodily determination is not easily perceivable below the veneer of artificialisation which human beings have acquired. But just as was shown in the opening of this study of attitudes, where a dipsomaniac's intellectual aversion to intoxicants was analysed, the body always gives its voice, and the determination of any attitude by that voice can always be seen if the attitude is analysed and reduced to its essentials. It is possible to find the bodily determination which gives the bias to a scholar's particular choice of study, to the statesman's efforts for political power, to the financial magnate's apparent urge to dominate and exploit his fellows. Whatever example is taken, and however purely intellectual the attitude may appear to be, a particular degree and description of inferiority in relation to the environment as a whole can be discovered as the motive and impulse power.

The importance of this is that the problems with

which human beings are faced are not so much those of difficulty of coping with the environment as of difficulty in cancelling out the conflict of interests within the social organisations. This means that the majority of such problems have no basis in reality. They are apparent. The real problem is the existence of any problems, and the key to this will be found in the bodily inferiority of particular human beings—in their incapacity to give free and full expression to their life-power without relying upon an infinity of compensating factors, amongst which the services of their fellow-beings are among the most vital.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES : ONLY APPARENTLY
TRUTHFUL.

In summing up the intellectualised attitude, the fact which emerges most significantly and clearly is that it does not truthfully represent the human being. It was seen that the instinctive attitude represented the net bodily worth of the human being at the moment in which the attitude was taken. That is to say, it could be taken as truthfully representing the human being. But with the intellectualised attitude this is not so. It appears to represent him in so much as it is peculiar

to him. His particular bodily determination gives it something of uniqueness no matter how formalised it may be. But the man taking such an attitude is a different man from what he was at the moment when the memory which directs the attitude was acquired. It is not, therefore, his worth at the moment of taking the attitude which is represented, but his worth at another time, when his bodily condition was different.

Also, it is not only the worth of the man, but the worth of the man as he is limited by the compensation involved, which is expressed in the attitude. It represents, not his assessment of himself in relation to the particular aspect of the environment with which he is faced, but the assessment of himself plus the compensation. He remains the vital and impulsive factor in taking the attitude, but the attitude is only apparently valid for him alone. If he were suddenly deprived of the compensation which is represented in it, the attitude would have no validity for the exact relationship existing between himself and the environment. It cannot, therefore, be called a truthful attitude, but only an apparently true attitude; and any behaviour resulting from it must be assessed not on a basis of truth, but of apparent truth.

INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDES : REALITY ONLY APPARENT.

Another point is that in such an attitude the human being has lost something of his grasp upon reality. In taking a truthful attitude, he may be said to have a full grasp of reality, since the assessments of self and environment are true. But where those assessments are only apparently true, the human being is seeing neither the environment nor himself in terms of reality. His attitude is one of equality with the environment, and he sees his own power enhanced to the point where it can strike that equality. But without the compensation there would be no equality—even apparent. The reality, therefore, of the conception which the attitude constitutes is only apparent. It must be said that the human being only perceives an apparent reality in appreciating the significance to himself or the particular aspect of the environment with which he is faced. And also that he only perceives an apparent reality in assessing himself as opposed to that particular aspect.

ATTITUDES IN THE STATE OF UNTRUTH

This leads to the attitude which is only imposed upon the human being and in which he is not represented in any way, except in so far as the attitude must be adapted to the particular degree of efficiency for carrying out certain behaviour which has been imposed upon him.

THREE ATTITUDES TO WEARING A UNIFORM.

If the attitudes of a man who is wearing a uniform are considered, the distinction between such attitudes and the one which is merely intellectualised will become clear. It is important, however, to consider first the conditions under which he comes to be dressed in a uniform. A uniform may be accepted as a standardisation of clothes to signify the immersion of a human being in an organisation.

There may be three main attitudes underlying the wearing of a uniform :

One may be an egoistic attitude. The human being might be fully aware of the extent to which

he will be submerged as a personality if he joins the organisation and wears the uniform. He may, however, have particular considerations which impel him to the attitude that it is better to accept the submergence and gratify the considerations, than to reject the submergence and be compelled to over-ride the considerations.

The second attitude may be one of unwilling submission. The egoistic human being may strongly resent the prospect of having to merge himself in an organisation and to forego the freedom of acting according to his own experiences and acquired knowledge. But although he resents the prospect, penalties are attached to his refusing to submit—penalties such as imprisonment, or even loss of life—which force him to over-ride his own mental direction and accept the compulsion to become part of the organisation merely as the lesser of two evils.

The third attitude may be one of sheer self-abandonment to the discipline and drill represented by the organisation. In this case the human being would be willing to be moulded and adapted to the organisation as it saw fit, because he was wholly unable, of himself, to arrive at any attitude of his relationship with the environment as a whole.

He would feel so incapable of coping with the environment that he would be prepared to submit to any form of organisation that would provide him with the supplying of his needs—food, clothing and shelter.

There is an alternative to this self-abandonment merely for food, clothing and shelter, which is, nevertheless, equally servile in its essentials : the attitude of the fanatic. The fanatic is one who has not abandoned himself to a tangible organisation as such. In his case it is a theory or a phantastic ideological conception before which he abases himself. But in such a case, the explanation is equally that the human being is utterly unable to cope with the environment on the basis of his own experience or the experiences of others which he has acquired as knowledge. His contact with reality is so vague that he is unable to see things even approximately as they are. He is unable to relate the environment and its impressions on him to anything within himself, either to his instinctive capacities or to the skills and accomplishments which belong to him as a result of the developments which training and experience generally have brought about in his consciousness and character. In this vagueness, and the sense of

bafflement or frustration which comes from it, he sees in the theory or the idea the means of abandoning all self- or ego-responsibility. The conception underlying the theory or idea, no matter how indefinite it may be, appears to him as embodying perfection, and he is, therefore, prepared to subserve himself utterly to whatever dictation its implications, or the organisation attached to it, might imply.

EGOISTIC ATTITUDE.

The first of these attitudes—the egoistic attitude—falls under the category of an intellectualised attitude, and the bodily determination and intellectual direction can be discovered in it. As a simple example, a man may wish to travel and see the world. As a means of attaining this object he decides to accept the submergence of himself involved in becoming a soldier and being regimented and uniformed. He knows that the regimentation and discipline will deny him freedom to have opinions, to indulge his peculiar idiosyncrasies with regard to dress, routine, diet and bodily habits. But he weighs this loss and the discomfort of submitting to discipline and self-obliteration against the urgency of his desire to travel and

experience the enjoyments he supposes it will bring him. In the balance he decides that his desire to travel outweighs the imminent disadvantages, and submits himself to service and the uniform. His wearing the uniform is, in effect, a compromise to which he agrees. He is, as it were, saying to the authorities of the military organisation:

“You provide me with the means to gratify this desire of mine to travel, which I have not the means to gratify for myself, and, as payment for what you do, I will serve as a soldier for a given period of years and accept all that the service implies.”

Such a human being can never be an efficient soldier in the full sense of the term. He might be quite obedient and appear to have abandoned himself completely ; but always underlying his obedience will be his own opinions, his own awareness of what his intellectual direction would impel him to do and be if he had not struck the bargain. If the limits of the demands which it is considered correct to make upon soldiers were demanded in his case, there would be circumstances where he would be unsoldierly and negligent, even if he did not rebel altogether. For instance, in civil dis-

orders, where people with whom he had sentiments in common were involved, he could not be relied upon to carry out blindly orders which seemed to him callous and cruel.

RESENTFUL SUBMISSION.

The second attitude—the one of resentful submission—may be illustrated by an example of a human being conscripted to become a soldier. In countries where conscription is a legal enactment and where, with particular exceptions, all must serve, there must be innumerable cases in every generation where all the egoistic direction of the human being is contrary to everything that military service involves. In most of such countries there are, however, heavy penalties attaching to a refusal to submit to conscription. It is not merely the penalties provided by the law which operate here. The penalties of loss of goodwill and esteem among the people who form the immediate social circle are sometimes more heavy, and to the highly egoistic human being the esteem of his fellow-beings is an important factor.

If we consider the attitude of such a human being to military service, we shall see that he can only submit in deep and constant resentment. In

every aspect of the discipline, some sharply defined intellectual tuning in the human being himself would have to be over-ridden. To carry himself in a soldierly manner would seem perhaps ridiculous, perhaps an impertinent interference with his own liberty of action. He would despise the efficient soldiers from whom it would be necessary to accept orders and reprimands. The uniform would be distasteful to him, and all the time he was wearing it his ego-consciousness would reproach him, or stir his resentment to a more acute pitch. The routine of service would seem to him hard and monotonous, and the enforced diet would be distasteful.

It is obvious that such a human being could never be an efficient soldier. He would, in fact, be less likely to become fully efficient than even the human being who accepted military service in the sense of a bargain. His attitude would always be one of intensifying resentment.

It is important to note here, however, that in both these cases the bodily system of the human beings would be modified by the military training. It does not matter that in one case the man is, as it were, willingly paying an agreed price, while in the other he is an unwilling slave. The training

to which both would be subjected would bring about bodily developments. Diet, physical evolutions in drill, the wearing of the uniform with the enforced carriage which its shape and cut bring about, all the range of experiences enforced upon them throughout the term of their service, would modify their bodily systems in innumerable ways, applying to their cells, their limbs and their brains memories which had no basis in the unique bodily needs or intellectual wants of either.

And once these memory modifications had been imposed upon them, neither of them could escape seeing and assessing their environment to a certain extent through the viewpoint of the military organisation. Once they had left the service their own uniqueness might once more assert itself and gradually break down these imposed memories, but, nevertheless, their attitudes would always carry a bias brought about by their consciousness and characters having to some extent been obliterated, and the consciousness and character represented by the military organisation substituted in their place.

SERVILE SUBMISSION.

But where the human being abandoned himself in blind submission to the organisation—as in the

case of the degenerate serving in return for food, clothing and shelter, or the fanatic abandoning himself to the theory or idea underlying the dictation—there would be no basis of give and take and no resentment. In either case, if the human being were so blunt of feeling and intellectual appreciation that he could arrive at no valuation of his relationship with environment on the basis of his own needs and wants and his experiences, he would see the tradition, theory or idea represented by the organisation as an adequate and satisfactory explanation of himself. He would have no attitude of his own, either to the organisation or to the rest of his fellow-beings and environment. Once he had been merged with the organisation and trained to a pitch of efficiency by it, no order would seem too callous or too fantastic for him to carry out without question and with an utter lack of fellow-feeling or fellow-sentiment. Examples of this may be found by the thousand in the behaviour of those who represented religion during the historical periods of persecution.

It is important to say here that the uniform we are considering need not be a military one : it might belong to a religious organisation or a political group. If it were a military one, it would

be a tradition of nationalism or military glory to which the degenerate human being would abandon himself ; if a religious one, a theological idea ; if a political one, a Utopian political or economic theory. In either case, the human being would be blind to the facts that his own bodily condition, being unique, had unique needs and desires, and that his particular range of experiences, whether acquired through behaviour or learning, vested him with unique wants. He would, as a consequence, see in the prescriptions of the tradition, idea, or theory, an ideal means of maintaining himself against the environment without self-responsibility and of giving expression to his life-power.

THE LAST INTELLECTUALISED ATTITUDE.

In taking this attitude it may be said that he takes the last intellectualised attitude possible to him. There is a bodily determination in the attitude. It is that the bodily resources have fallen below the point where it is possible for him to meet the environment, whether by bodily action or by skills and accomplishments, without being to some extent at the mercy of the forces in the environment. This does not mean that he could

no longer exercise skills or carry out bodily movements in response to impressions from the environment. But it does mean that his capacity and capability, either truthfully or apparently truthfully, to assess himself in relation to the environment have become so weak that he would be like a ship or vehicle without any directive power. He would arrive at assessments, but they would have no basis in either reality or apparent reality—only in imagination.

The body, therefore, speaks for the last time. It informs him through his imagination of the necessity to submit to some form of dictation if he is not to be at the mercy of the environmental forces. He is also intellectually directed for the last time. The memories of his own experiences, and those he has acquired by learning, direct him as to the particular dictation to which he decides he shall submit.

For instance, a degenerate of the parasitical class in society would probably be directed by his intellectualisation to see a military tradition as an attractive form of dictation, whereas a degenerate of slums would incline to a Utopian political theory or a religious idea. The instance is no more than an example. Any form of dictation

might appear preferable to a member of any social grade, but the selection would always be in accordance with the teaching and experience of the human being concerned.

INSTINCT AND INTELLECT CRUSHED OUT WHERE
TRADITIONS, IDEAS, AND THEORIES DICTATE.

Having once taken the step, however, bodily determination and intellectual direction must cease. On the one side there is the dictation—the tradition, idea, or theory. It has not been worked out to accord with the particular bodily needs of any human being. It is not a supple and elastic framework. Underlying it is always some imaginative conception—but a conception of a regime, condition or state, not a conception of human beings. It postulates the attainment of the perfect working of the regime, of the establishment of perfect conditions of existence for some spiritual extension of the human being, such as a spirit or soul, or of the organisation of some “perfect” social machine.

The behaviour by which this “perfection” is to be brought about is rigidly prescribed and allows of no consideration for individual or personal idiosyncrasies. Its first demand is that the human

being, as such, must be wholly submerged. He must become a mere unit, whose resources of life-power and energetic expression are to be routinised solely in the interests of the symbolic conception of the perfect state. As inducements to submit to this, rewards and penalties are laid down—rewards and penalties which in most cases are no more than promises and threats utterly divorced from reality, such as the promises of Heaven and threats of Hell which attach to religious ideas.

On the other side is the degenerate human being prepared to abandon himself to any ruling and any discipline in return for the ready-made assessments of the relationship with environment, with which the conception will provide him.

IMPOSED ATTITUDES : WHAT CONSTITUTES THEM.

If we now consider the human being as he must react under such dictation, it will be possible to see what constitutes an imposed attitude. Once he has abandoned himself to the organisation, his environment remains superficially as it was before. He must still be in contact with natural forces, with the forces of society and with his fellow-beings. That being so, he must still respond to the impressions they make upon him, with atti-

tudes which will express his valuation of them and of himself in relation to them.

DICTATED ATTITUDES TO NOURISHMENT.

For instance, with regard to diet. He must continue to take nourishment, but if the organisation—as is the case with a number of religious and military organisations—prescribes a particular diet, he will not consult his own personal preferences or tastes. They will still exist. But the organisation would prescribe that to indulge tastes and preferences is weakness, gluttonous, or in some way unfitting. The degenerate's attitude, therefore, would be such that forms of nourishment are harmful—that is to say, the dictation would wholly over-ride his particular bodily determination and impose an attitude upon him which was quite untrue to him.

DICTATED ATTITUDES IN SOCIAL RELATIONS.

Or, again, with the manners and customs of the society outside the organisation. The degenerate's particular origin and teaching might have left him (before accepting the dictation) with preferences to practise a particular manner and social behaviour. But again the organisation would condemn such

practices as unseemly, and he would accept that ruling. It would not matter that this particular state of intellectualisation, if it could be given scope, would direct him to just those practices. That would be over-ridden and the attitude would be imposed—and he would accept it—that such behaviour is disreputable.

Then, again, in his attitudes to his fellow-beings. The old competitive basis of fellow-sentiments and intellectual attractions, of fellow-aversions and intellectual repulsions, would still exist—if he could arrive at any clear appreciation of how he was determined or directed in relation to them. But now the dictation has come into play and all his fellow-beings come under two headings: (those who espouse the conception underlying the dictatorial organisation,) and (those who do not.) With the former, his attitude would be one of comradeship. They would be like himself, units in the organisation, and none of their attitudes would antagonise him. But the rest would be cut off from him. He would have no points of contact with them. Their attitudes would be at variance with all the behaviour prescribed by the dictation, and therefore his attitudes to them would vary from contempt to hatred, according

to whether they were innocuous to or threatened the organisation he has come to represent. And still the attitude would have nothing to do with his particular bodily condition or mentality. It would belong—as he does—wholly and solely to the dictation.

DICTATED ATTITUDES TO DEPORTMENT.

Reverting to the wearing of a uniform, as prescribed by such an organisation, it can be seen how even the attitude to bodily movements of the human being would be prescribed for him. If it were a military uniform, his attitude would be that he would discredit the uniform and his Service if he were to walk in a free-and-easy manner. Bodily fatigue or his particular degree of bodily health—if it could be allowed to express itself—might tend to determine him to a slouching walk or lounging pose. But his attitude to such would be that it would be calculated to throw discredit upon the uniform and upon the Service it represents.

The attitude of the dictation would, therefore, over-ride all bodily feeling and mental considerations, and he would draw himself up, to walk with the rigidity and smartness prescribed by his drill.

If it were a religious uniform, his attitude to such a military stride would be that it was arrogant, or to a free-and-easy slouching walk that it was irreverent. So, no matter what impulses came from within himself, he would walk with the humility and self-effacing pace of one who represented not himself, but a religious order. And his attitude to all other strides would vary from disgust to hatred in just so far as it was negligently or positively opposed to all that the religion stood for.

HUMAN BEING AUTOMATISED BY DISCIPLINE AND DRILL.

In all his behaviour, no matter what phase of his relationship with the environment it responded to, the human being's attitude would be of the same description—not reflecting himself or his experiences, but the training of the organisation. And as the attitudes which would reflect the organisation had no basis in the human being himself, he could only reflect them efficiently to the extent to which they had been imposed upon him. That is, he could not commence as an efficient member. It would be necessary for him to undergo drills and discipline before his bodily system and memories could be adapted to rigidly

reproduce the patterns laid down. If he reached complete efficiency he would, in effect, have ceased to exist as a human being. He would be merely a unit—a member—of the dictatorial organisation, an utterly willing tool to be used in any way whatsoever which the dictation might prescribe.

Dictated attitude has no reality and
apparent reality.

In such attitudes and the behaviour resulting from them, reality would no longer have a place. The reality of the human being would be what he himself, as a conscious organism, represented in relation to the environment. The reality of the environment would be what significance it had for him as a conscious organism intrinsically endowed with a particular degree of capacity of resistance and self-assertion to it. But his attitudes would hold nothing of this. Only the symbolic conception which his dictatorial organisation represents is considered. It is its relationship to the environment which is expressed in the human being's attitudes. Whatever discrepancy there is between these two must be made up by the adaptation of the human being—by his

suppression and by his being moulded to scale and model.

DICTATED ATTITUDES : UNREAL TIME-VALUES.

But the very fact that the conception is symbolic means that it is not related to present or even past time-values. Being symbolic, it is divorced from all experience. It cannot, therefore, be related to any future time-value which can be estimated through the human capacity to reason. That is to say, it must be related to an unreal time-value—such as the religious conception of a “ hereafter ” and “ eternity,” or the “ millennium ” of an economic theory.

If it is a military tradition which the human being's attitudes represent, the time-value is not so obviously indefinite. Yet a tradition can be attached to no specific past experience. It is something which has grown up amorphously over a historic period. And its preservation is not directed to any particular and measurable time calculation. It is, in fact, divorced from actuality to just the extent that the human being is divorced from himself.

For the purposes of the illustration, examples have been taken of human beings who have

reached the lowest stage of degeneration, where they are prepared to fanatically abandon themselves to every prescription and ruling of a code. In life as we know it today such types are rare. Many of the fanatics are driven by an intense egoism, and exploit the tradition, idea, or theory they serve for the gratification of some compelling intellectual want, such as a want for power or influence over others, to draw attention to themselves and be respected, or for similar reasons.

HUMAN TYPES THAT SUBMIT TO DICTATION.

What is more common today is the human being who still retains much of his capability for intellectual direction of his behaviour, but has reached the point where decadence is verging on to degeneration. He is still opinionated, but a vagueness has entered into his valuations. He can specify his needs and wants, but can only relate them to the reality of his environment in a muddled and indefinite way. He is not prepared to abandon himself to a dictation, yet has a vague awareness of the need for some outside control. The result is that though systems of dictation have emerged, they are not clear-cut and wholly autocratic.

They allow for a certain degree of egoistic assertion in those who submit to them.

Then again, tendencies to submit to dictation have become apparent, and means of meeting them are incorporated into the mechanism of social life. For instance, there is the dictation involved in the subjection of the bodily system to some mechanical contrivance. To make this clear we may take a similar example to that used in illustrating the intellectualised attitude to exercise. We may assume that a man who is following a certain routine of life becomes aware of the need for exercise, to counteract some definite effects which have begun to show in his bodily system.

DICTATED ATTITUDE TO CURRICULA OF MOVEMENT.

As the merely intellectualised human being, he was able to arrive at a definite assessment of the form of exercise which suited best with his circumstances and condition. But if we think of him as gone beyond the stage of clear-cut rational processes, it can be understood that though he gains the awareness of the necessity for some form of exercise, he is not able to assert himself as to the choice of that form. He would then look for some kind of—not guidance—but control. Possibly

some carefully worded advertisement would dictate a choice to him, and the more authoritative and dictatorial the wording the more likely he would be to regard it with respect.

Such advertisements are a common feature of present-day propaganda. They dogmatically assert the need for submission to some code of exercises or to the use of some mechanical contrivance. Always there are promises and threats attached to the dictatorial statement: assertions that if the code or contrivance is resorted to, there will be beneficial results, such as greatly developed chests or limbs, or that the human being will gain authority in his relations with his fellow-beings. On the other hand, there are assertions that if the means offered are ignored there will be grave penalties to pay, such as loss of health, vitality, popularity or authority.

We can assume that the man who is looking for some form of control through which he can exercise himself submits to the threats and promises and begins to use a mechanical contrivance. Here there is a bodily determination underlying the attitude that exercise must be taken. But there has been no bodily determination or intellectual direction in the choosing of the means of exercise.

The man has merely submitted himself to the dictatorial advertisement. This means that in his attitude to the mechanical exerciser, nothing of himself is represented. He is merely prepared to abandon himself to whatever the exerciser imposes.

DICTATED ATTITUDES : BASED ON FEAR AND HOPE.

But he must have some attitude before he can use it. He must, therefore, have his attitude dictated by the system of advertising and the exerciser itself. The advertising dictates that he shall carry out the instructions attached to the exerciser, and that he shall expect the promised benefits from doing so, or fear the threatened penalties if he refuses to do so. That is his attitude in approaching the exerciser.

But similarly in using it. He has no freedom of movement whatever. His body cannot take the attitude that its particular asymmetries and disproportions impel movements of a certain rhythm and form. However pronounced such asymmetries and disproportions might be, they must come under the subjection of the mechanical contrivance, and all movement must be carried out exactly as the contrivance dictates.

For instance, in the use of a spring-grip dumb-

bell, before any movement can be made the man must grip the dumb-bell. Even in that his grip is dictated as to its nature by the shape, contour and tension of the spring mechanism. The attitude, therefore, which his body must take to the subsequent movements carried out with the dumb-bell is dictated by it. The grip sets the muscles of the arms, and everything of the body which supports the arms, in a fixed pose. The energy-value to support the grip, which is conveyed through the blood-stream, must flow in the channel thus set up. But now, with that pose and channelisation held in a set rigidity, exercises are to be carried out as dictated by the instructions given with the dumb-bell.

Dictated Attitudes : Over-ride Opposition of
Body and Mind.

Far from there being a call from the bodily system for such exercises, the freedom of the bodily resources to carry out movement is already restricted by the grip, so that there is rather a repudiation of a need for movement than a tendency to it. That is to say, the attitude of the body, if the human being were not too blunted to perceive it and its significance, is one of opposition to further

movement. But the dictation over-rides this opposition, and movements are imposed upon the body. Necessarily the scope and rhythm of the movements must be dictated, since if left free the body would carry out no movements at all.

The same is true here as was stated with regard to the impelling of intellectual movements: no preparation can be made by the body itself to support the movements. It can only support the tissues involved in the way that is dictated by the imposed movements. There is, therefore, the same risk of strain and lesion.

Dictated Attitudes : Banish Human Being
from Himself.

But there is a still further result. Every stimulation of the blood-flow to support movements results in a depositing of energy-value at the particular bodily parts involved in the movement. That is to say, there is a bodily modification resulting from every movement. But if the movement is dictatorially imposed upon the body, the modification is so equally. That is, as the result of the carrying out of the exercises imposed by the dumb-bell and its instructions, the man's bodily system is subjected to imposed modifica-

tions—and these modifications must reflect the rigidity and channelisation which characterised the conditions imposed upon the body in carrying out the exercises. Hard and rigid developments are therefore brought about in the man's bodily system.

But immediately they have been brought about and are, therefore, incorporated into the total character of the man, they in turn must be reflected in all his future attitudes. So that all his future attitudes will be modified by the first submission to dictation. And as the imposed developments are unrelated to any inner need or call from the body, they constitute a partial removal of the human being from himself. If he is able to respond to future impressions from the environment through the medium of his bodily determination as directed by his intellectual experiences, the imposed modifications, with all the rigidity and the submissiveness which went to their making, will be represented in both determination and direction. So that the tendency to submit to dictation will have been consolidated, and the first element of standardisation to a mechanically responding type of human being will have been introduced. All the man's subsequent attitudes

will carry the value (or, more correctly, liability) of that first negation of himself.

This may be simply illustrated if we think of the man as continuing the exercises until some of the promises attached to the dictatorial advertisement have materialised. Developments will have been imposed, for instance, upon the muscles of his biceps and chest. But these muscle-developments are not the free, supple muscling of the naturally unfolded body. The man does not carry them with spontaneous ease and grace, able to bring them into play with spontaneous vigour and elasticity, to produce beautiful, self-controlled and freely vigorous movements and gestures. Everyone knows the cramping effect of such developments, and has seen men carrying them as though they carried a burden, and seen the sluggish, laborious, stiff movements which result when they are brought into play. That is to say, the bodily system's attitude to the developments is one of resistance. It bears them unwillingly and ungraciously, and is only able to co-ordinate their use with the use of the body as a whole by a laboured and dragging process.

DICTATED ATTITUDES : BLOTTING OUT OF REALITY,
INDIVIDUALITY AND PERSONALITY.

If we consider the reality of the human being's conceptions when his attitudes must be controlled by such developments, it is clear that to just the extent that the developments play their part, the human being is utterly removed from reality. He might be taking an attitude to a fellow-being, but so far as the developments are represented the attitude will have nothing to do with either himself or the human being he appraises. It will have to do with the dictation which brought about the developments—something quite outside of himself and his fellow-being and the relationship with the general environment which exists at the moment. When it is considered that every exercising of dictation upon the human being, to which he submits, brings about some imposed development, it can be seen how far from reality the human being is removed. In the case of one who has wholly abandoned himself to any form of dictation he is quite divorced from reality. And that means he is quite divorced from himself. As a self-expression of his own life-power he has ceased to exist. He has, in fact, become a complete nonentity.

DICTATED ATTITUDES UNTRUTHFUL, DENY BODY,
MIND AND ENVIRONMENT.

It can also be seen that neither the truth, which belonged to instinctive attitudes, nor the appearance of truth, which belonged to the intellectualised attitude, can apply to an attitude which has been imposed. First of all, the human being's bodily determination is not represented in any way—that is to say, the attitude denies the bodily system and its resources. Yet it is the bodily resources which are forced to take up the attitude.

Similarly with the intellectual characterisation of the man. His mind is a compound of memories of experiences which he has either undergone himself or has learned that others have undergone. The dictated attitude, however, has no regard for such experiences or the direction they might give the human being in adopting an attitude. It is not that the bodily powers have been given scope to break down the memories through the natural process of forgetfulness and replace them by instinctive capacities of cognition. The memories remain, but they must be wholly overborne. Yet the human being's mind, as well as his body, is used as the means of adopting the imposed atti-

tude. That is to say, the attitude denies both body and mind.

Further, the aspect of the environment with which the human being is faced at the moment of adopting a dictated attitude has a particular significance for the body and mind he denies by the attitude. So that body, mind, and environment are all denied. It can only be said, therefore, that the dictated attitude is neither truthful, nor apparently truthful, but untruthful. And, necessarily, all behaviour resulting from it is equally untruthful.

SUMMARY.

To sum up the whole analysis of attitudes, there are three classifications into which every human attitude may fall: the instinctive, truthful attitude, which constitutes a full and direct awareness of reality by the human being who takes it; the intellectualised attitude, which is only apparently true, and constitutes only an apparent awareness of reality by the human being; and, finally, the dictated attitude, which is utterly untruthful and constitutes an absolute denial of reality. The importance of a proper understanding of attitudes is that they are the basis from which all human action or

behaviour springs. When we witness particular behaviour by our fellow-beings, it is possible to see the attitude underlying the behaviour, and the dictation, intellectualisation or bodily determination underlying the attitude. And when we can perceive these and know the causes which brought them into being, we are no longer baffled by the problems that face us personally or humanity as a whole. We may remain baffled as to the means by which a remedy can be applied, but the direction along which such remedial action must move is not obscure or puzzling.

Perhaps the gravest transition from one category of attitude to another, and one which has particular application to life at the present time, is that where the intellectualised human being decides to submit to dictation. Such a thing can only arise where intellectualisation has become complicated to the degree that human beings find themselves subject to a certain degree of confusion in their opinions. They find themselves unable to translate their attitudes into practicalities, become baffled by the multiplicity of problems, anomalies and contradictions which social life presents to them, and finally submit to the dictation of an idea or theory rather than maintain the effort

required to assert themselves egoistically in relation to their surroundings as a whole.

This happens with regard both to the mental submission to a theory or idea and the submission of the bodily system as a whole to a system or organisation. The young man who has completed his education and endeavours to assert himself egoistically against the dictatorial intellectual trends in the abstract attitudes of his day is an example. The dictation of tradition tends strongly to envelop him, so that he no longer expresses the knowledge he has acquired through his own unique mental direction. There are set standards by which the more submissive in society arrive at valuations of everything surrounding them, and of the behaviour of their fellow-beings. At first the young man feels his own bodily determination and mental direction bringing him into conflict with these set standards. He sees that no standards can be valid which attempt to dictate rulings for an infinite variety of human beings. This stage is spoken of indulgently by those who are already under the dictation of tradition and theories as "the revolt of youth," and it is becoming a truism that with advancing years the young man foregoes his ego-assertion and submits.

But it is the young man's personality which is speaking for itself when he rebels. When he submits, it is the passing of his personality ; its submersion beneath the dictatorial pressures with which he is surrounded. But his earlier rebellion—that is, his personality—rested upon his physiological uniqueness. The memory modifications which his training and education had imposed upon him had been tuned by the unique value of his bodily system. When they were represented in his attitudes they gave them a bias peculiar to him, so that he was not merely parroting the knowledge he had acquired. He was adapting it to his own personality and expressing his ego in his conceptions, estimations and values.

The moment, however, that he decides to carry on no longer the struggle of personal assertion against the deadweight of dictatorial pressures, he no longer represents the uniqueness which properly belongs to him. All the particular modifications of brain, muscle and nerve tissues which constitute him a definite expression of the human life-power must be over-ridden. When he speaks and behaves subsequently, it is no longer he himself that is being manifested, but the traditions, ideas or theories to which he has abandoned himself.

An example on the side of bodily submission to a system or organisation is a similar type of young man who, as a profession or means of earning his livelihood in society, joins a commercial, industrial or civil organisation. In most cases, part of the education which has been imposed upon such a man is the conception that "the team spirit" is admirable, and one which will be beneficial to human life if it can be widely or entirely represented in the social activities. Actuated by this spirit the young man enters the organisation, not with the aim of imposing himself upon it, asserting his peculiar qualities and attributes, his unique range of attitudes in the organisation, and modifying it accordingly. On the contrary, his aim is to merge himself with it, to become an integral part of it, abnegating himself and endeavouring to assure the self- and ego-abnegation of others, so that the system which the organisation represents may function on the basis of the—as he supposes—admirable team spirit.

With this purpose he subserves his own bodily energies, his routine, his interests—everything, in fact, which marks him off as a personality—to the interests of the system. In so doing, he too is over-riding definite modifications

of his own bodily system. The skills, accomplishments, specialities, preferences, dislikes, enthusiasms and passions of every human being always represent the unduplicated particularities of bodily form and mental development which constitute him a unique expression in the universe. If and when he submits to submersion in an organisation, no matter whether his submission is in the name of "the team spirit" or any other shibboleth, he is denying that uniqueness, allowing the only things that justify his particular existence—his individual and personal particularities—to be submerged and finally suppressed.

Nor is there any virtue in submitting to such conditions for a time with the hope that at some later period it will be possible to resume one's personality and once more gain some degree of ego-expression from life. Dictation in whatever form it takes is deadening. The uniqueness atrophies with disuse and lack of expression, and all the time that dictation is being undergone standardised modifications are being imposed upon the human being's bodily system and brain. The capacity to arrive at intellectually tuned decisions, and indeed all initiative, are gradually lost, and finally a nonentity is produced who has no value

either to himself or his fellow-beings. Only the dictation he has served can use him, and that soullessly, callously, with the utter indiscrimination that sees human beings not so much as living organisms representing some specific energy-significance in the universe, but as cogs, mechanical units to be fitted into the machinery of the system.

That benevolent-appearing indulgence which the older submissives express towards the intense and egoistic youth who endeavours to meet and face up to life on the basis of his own particular mental direction and bodily attributes, is as false in its patronage of the young as the life these would-be superiors lead for themselves. They are the ones who should be patronised because they have foregone the uniqueness which the youth is striving to express. They, too, began by striving in the same way, but they were unequal to the struggle. The pressure of dictatorial trends was too much for them. They succumbed and have become mere parrot-wise units in the social organisation. Now they foresee a similar failure as inevitable for the youths they patronise.

Such a failure is far from inevitable, however. The youth struggling for his ego-assertion, striving to remain a personality, is the one who is right.

If he persists in his struggle and refuses all dictation, whatever its nature, there is hope for him. If he can gain an understanding of what his attitudes represent, and see the debasement involved in having his intrinsic uniqueness over-ridden, he will not later become a servile tool of either a system or organisation within the society, nor a parrot-repeater of the set standards which have become rigid and lost all scope for individual or personal application.

As far as it affects any one of us particularly, to understand our attitudes is to know something of the source from which our passions and prejudices spring, and in which our special weaknesses or strengths are grounded. We may not be able wholly to control ourselves in that knowledge, but at least we know the comparative values of our attitudes, and can use our awareness to give them a bias towards the freeing of our impulses: to avoid the indignity of untruthful dictated attitudes and see that we ourselves are represented to the utmost possible extent.





